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The Overtime Pay Provisions of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Paul L. Schumann 
It has long been recognized in the United States that excessive use of 
overtime hours may be partially responsible for continued high rates of 
unemployment. For although a large proportion of overtime hours is 
due to disequilibrium phenomena, such as rush orders, seasonal de-
mand, mechanical failures, and absenteeism, a substantial amount of 
overtime appears to be regularly scheduled. If even a fraction of this 
overtime were converted to new full-time jobs, the effect on the un-
employment rate might be substantial. In 1977, for example, average 
weekly overtime in manufacturing was 3.4 hours/employee. If one-fifth 
of this had been eliminated and converted into new full-time jobs, em-
ployment levels for production workers would have risen by 1.7 per-
centage points. As a consequence, proposals for amending the overtime 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to restrict the use 
of overtime, including those that would increase the overtime premium 
to double time, have been periodically introduced in Congress. 
Our paper is a contribution to the debate over the efficacy of such 
proposals. We begin by providing a brief history of hours-of-work leg-
islation in the United States and discussing a conceptual framework 
within which the evolution of the legislation can be explained and/or 
understood. We then trace the growth of the share of nonwage items 
in total labor cost and of employers' use of overtime hours, and discuss 
the possible connection between these two trends. We then critically 
evaluate the available empirical evidence on the relationship between 
the overtime premium, hours of work, and employment. This section 
results in an agenda for future research needs, rather than a set of 
definitive conclusions. Finally, our concluding section discusses the 
policy implications of our study. Although we believe additional re-
search, some of which we are currently starting to undertake for the 
Minimum Wage Study Commission, is required before one can fully 
NOTE: We are grateful to numerous colleagues at Cornell, and to Solomon PolacheK, 
Gregg Lewis, Finis Welch, and Steven Welch for their comments on an earlier version. 
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evaluate the wisdom of amending the overtime provisions of the FLSA, 
a number of general conclusions are presented in this section. 
History of Hours-of-Work Legislation in the United States 
The earliest forms of hours-of-work legislation in the United States were 
initiated at the state level, applied to women and children, and had the 
aim of reducing fatigue and exhaustion.1 For example, maximum-hours-
of-work legislation was introduced in Massachusetts in 1879, where its 
supporters claimed that long workweeks were exhausting and caused 
women to grow prematurely old.2 The first hours laws covering men in 
the private sector were also at the state level and covered occupations 
in which long workweeks adversely affected third parties or employees 
themselves. An 1890 Ohio law limited hours of workers who operated 
trains in the hope that this would reduce railroad accident rates and 
protect the traveling public. This law was quickly followed by state laws 
limiting workweeks in mining to protect miners who were subject to 
unhealthy and unsafe working conditions.3 
One may argue that in each of these cases the rationale for the 
protective labor legislation is that the marginal social cost of longer 
workweeks exceeded the marginal private cost to employers. In the 
absence of government intervention these divergencies persisted because 
low family incomes did not permit many women and children the luxury 
of turning down jobs with low wages and long hours, because no good 
alternatives to the railroads existed for long-range travel and railroad 
passengers were not always accurately informed about railroad em-
ployees' workweeks, and because the limited alternative employment 
opportunities in mining communities (the "company town") often re-
stricted the occupational choice of individuals in those areas. In each 
case, then, markets failed, in the sense that compensating wage (or 
price) differentials did not arise to compensate employees (or railroad 
passengers) for the full risks they incurred because of long hours of 
work. The case for government intervention was strong; the only real 
issue was why the legislation took the form of outright restrictions on 
hours rather than the use of tax or penalty schemes to increase em-
'John R. Commons and John B. Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1920), pp. 242-63; George E. Paulsen, "The Legislative History of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1959), pp. 1-10; 
Orme Phelps, The Legislative Background of the Fair Labor Standards Act (Chicago: 
Chicago University Studies in Business Administration, 1939), p. 4; and U.S. Department 
^ of Labor, Premium Payments for Overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1967). 
:
""
 2Marion Cahill, Shorter Hours (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), pp. 106-7. 
| , 3Paulsen, "History of FLSA," pp. 14-15. 
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ployers' marginal private cost of longer hours. The well-known pref-
erence of Congress and state legislatures for standards rather than tax-
subsidy schemes may reflect only the fact that the majority of their 
members are lawyers who are comfortable with the standards approach.4 
Although the average workweek in manufacturing had fallen from 
51.0 hours in 1909 to 44.2 in 1929, throughout the early 1930s bills were 
repeatedly introduced into Congress to limit the length of the workweek. 
While the goal of protecting existing employees from the ills associated 
with excessive fatigue remained, a second explicit purpose of such leg-
islation was to increase employment by distributing the available work. 
Ultimately, on June 25, 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
was enacted. Its overtime provisions established a minimum rate of time-
and-a-half of the regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 44 
per week by covered employees, with the penalty rate beginning after 
42 hours in the next year, and 40 hours per week thereafter. (Initial 
drafts of the legislation established outright prohibitions of long hours. 
The idea of instituting a penalty for overtime instead apparently was 
instituted only as a compromise during the late stages of the debate.)5 
In its final form, the act covered less than one-fifth of all employees. 
Since then, coverage under the overtime provisions of the act has been 
expanded until now approximately 58 percent of all employees are cov-
ered (table 1). The major noncovered categories are supervisory em-
 ; 
ployees, outside salespersons, employees in seasonal industries (includ- i 
ing agriculture), state and local government employees, employees in j 
small retail trade establishments, and some household workers. 
Once again, the provisions of the act can be rationalized in terms v 
of the divergence between private and social costs. Even if employers 
and their employees in the 1930s were satisfied with long workweeks, 
their private calculations ignored the social costs borne by the unem-
ployed. The time-and-a-half rate for overtime can be thought of as a 
tax to make employers bear the full marginal social cost of their hours 
decisions; it should serve to reduce the use of overtime hours and, to 
the extent that the increased costs do not substantially reduce total man-
hours demanded, stimulate employment.6 Furthermore, if employees 
4
 Allen Kneese and Charles Schultze, Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975). A discussion of the standards-versus-tax-subsidy issue 
is included in Russell F. Settle and Burton Weisbrod, "Governmentally Imposed Stand-
ards: Some Normative Aspects," in Ronald G. Ehrenberg, editor, Research in Labor 
Economics, vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1978), pp. 159-91. 
5
 Paulsen, "History of FLSA," pp. 240-44; Phelps, Legislative Background, pp. 4-6; and 
Jonathan Grossman, "Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Mm" 
imum Wage," Monthly Labor Review 101 (June 1979): 22-30. 
6
 As with any other tax designed to correct an externality, such as an effluent tax designed 
to reduce the emission of pollutants, the time-and-a-half rate for overtime should lead to 
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were not satisfied with long workweeks during the 1930s but, because 
of market imperfections, did not have the freedom to choose employ-
ment with employers who offered shorter workweeks, the direct pay-
ment of the tax to employees who worked longer workweeks can be 
understood as an attempt to remedy this imperfection. We shall discuss 
this point in more detail when we evaluate proposals to modify the 
overtime provisions of the FLSA.7 
The Employment-Hours Trade-off: The Growth of Fringe Benefits and 
Overtime Hours 
Although coverage under the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA has 
increased substantially over the last forty years, the premium itself has 
remained constant at time and a half. Periodically proposals have been 
introduced in Congress to raise the premium to double time.8 Supporters 
of the increase argue that even though unemployment remains a pressing 
national problem, the use of overtime hours has increased in recent 
years. Moreover, the deterrent effect of the overtime premium has been 
weakened since enactment of the FLSA because of the growing share 
of hiring and training costs, fringe benefits, and government-mandated 
insurance premiums in total compensation. Many of these costs (such 
as vacation pay, holiday pay, sick leave, hiring costs) are "quasi-fixed" 
or employee-related, rather than hours-related; that is, they do not vary 
with overtime hours of work. An increase in these costs reduces em-
ployers' marginal costs of working their existing work forces overtime 
relative to their costs of hiring new employees.9 It is claimed that the 
a reduction in output and some decline in total man-hours demanded. One cannot, how-
ever, evaluate the tax as being "bad" simply because output is lower, as Sol Polachek 
suggested in his conference comments; that is a necessary consequence of the attempt to 
correct the externality. 
7
 Literally hundreds of court decisions handed down since the FLSA was enacted confirm 
that Congress had the dual intent of (a) inducing employers to reduce hours of work and 
increase employment, and (b) compensating employees for the "burden" of long work-
weeks. See, for example, Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., Ala. 1945, 
65 S.Ct. 1242, 1250, 325 U.S. 419, 89 L. Ed. 1705, rehearing denied 66 S.Ct. 12, 326 U.S. 
804, 90 L'. Ed. 489. 
8The most recent attempt was made by Congressman John Conyers in H.R. 1784, intro-
duced into Congress on February 1, 1979. 
'The formal theory of how these quasi-fixed costs influence employers' employment and 
hours decisions is detailed in a number of studies. See, for example, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 
Fringe Benefits and Overtime Behavior (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1971), pp. 5-47; 
idem, "Heterogeneous Labor, the Internal Labor Market, and the Employment-Hours 
Decision," Journal of Economic Theory 3 (March 1971): 85-104; Walter Oi, "Labor as 
a Quasi-Fixed Factor of Production," Journal of Political Economy 70 (October 1962): 
535-55; Sherwin Rosen, "Short-Run Employment Variations in Class I Railroads," Econ-
ometrica 36 (July/October 1968): 511-29; and idem, "The Supply of Work Schedules and 
Employment," in National Commission for Employment Policy, Work Time and Em-
ployment, Special Report no. 28 (Washington, D.C, 1978), pp. 145-74. 
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00 TABLE 1 
WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS AND THEIR OVERTIME COVERAGE, SEPTEMBER 1977 
(in thousands of workers) 
Industry 
All 
Private sector 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Contract construction 
Manufacturing 
Transportation and 
public utilities 
Wholesale trade 
Retail trade 
. Finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
Service industries 
Private household 
Total 
87,164 
71,647 
1,505 
862 
4,157 
19,941 
4,653 
4,428 
14,035 
4,554 
15,618 
1,894 
Executive, 
Administrative, 
and 
Professional3 
16,363 
10,137 
74 
99 
417 
2,323 
529 
629 
1,390 
658 
4,018 
0 
Outside 
Sales3 
2,111 
2,111 
0 
0 
3 
403 
6 
750 
127 
791 
31 
0 
Non-
supervisory* 
68,690 
59,399 
1,431 
763 
3,737 
17,215 
4,118 
3,049 
12,518 
3,105 
11,569 
1,894 
Non-
supervisory 
Subject to 
Overtime 
50,586 
48,085 
0 
751 
3,682 
16,913 
2,454 
2,930 
8,885 
2,968 
8,412 
1,090 
Percentage 
of Non-
supervisory 
Subject to 
Overtime0 
74 
81 
0 
98 
99 
98 
60 
96 
71 
96 
73 
58 
Percentage 
of Total 
Subject to 
Overtime* 
58 
67 
0 
87 
89 
85 
53 
66 
63 
65 
54 
58 
to 
ON 
NO 
Public sector 
Federal 
State and local 
government 
15,517 
2,717 
12,800 
6,226 
509 
5,717 
0 
0 
0 
9,291 
2,208 
7,083 
2,501 
2,156 
345 
27 
98 
5 
16 
79 
3 
a
 Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA includes among exempt covered employees "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or 
professional capacity (including any employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary 
schools) or in the capacity of outside salesmen." 
b
 Excluding outside sales workers. 
c
 Provisions of FLSA (5)/(4)-100. 
d
 Provisions of FLSA (5)/(l)100. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Standards under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (Washington, D.C., October 1978), table 11. 
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growth of these items has been at least partially responsible for the 
increase in overtime and that an increase in the overtime premium is 
required to offset this adverse effect. 
Data on average weekly overtime hours for manufacturing indus-
tries have been collected and published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) since 1956. Using annual data for all manufacturing, durable 
manufacturing, and nondurable manufacturing industries, we have es-
timated equations in which weekly overtime hours were specified to be 
a function of a time trend and the growth in real gross national product 
(GNP), the latter to control for cyclical factors (table 2). These equations 
indicate that after controlling for cyclical factors and autocorrelation in 
the residuals, average weekly overtime hours have increased by 0.028 
to 0.029 hours each year.10 This implies that average weekly overtime 
hours have increased by 0.616 hours over the twenty-two-year period 
covered by our sample. / / all of this increase in overtime had been 
converted to full-time (forty hours/week) jobs, employment in manu-
facturing would have been 1.5 percent higher in 1977.n 
Could this increase in the use of overtime have been due to the 
increase in quasi-fixed nonwage costs, which increased the marginal cost 
of new employees relative to that of overtime hours? The answer de-
pends upon both the magnitude of the increase in quasi-fixed costs and 
the empirical relationship existing among these costs, employment, and 
overtime hours. Empirical evidence on the increase in fringe benefits 
is quite abundant. For example, Department of Commerce data for the 
nation as a whole (table 3) show that forms of compensation other than 
wages and salaries (supplements) rose from 6.2 percent of total com-
pensation in 1956 to 14.7 percent in 1977. These data understate the 
importance of nonwage items in total compensation because they include 
holiday, vacation, and sick pay as wages. A more comprehensive meas-
ure, although for a more limited sample, comes from the biennial U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce Survey of Manufacturing Establishments. These 
data show that total fringe benefits as a percentage of payroll rose from 
20.3 percent to 37.3 percent during the 1957-1977 period (table 4). Both 
10
 Only for the nondurable manufacturing equation, however, is the estimated annual 
increase statistically significantly different from zero. Moreover, as Sol Polachek noted 
in his conference comments, when a quadratic trend term is added to the equation, one 
observes that the upward drift in overtime hours appeared to cease sometime between 
1971 and 1973. This evidence should therefore be considered only suggestive. We should 
stress, however, that in any case evidence on the trend in overtime hours is not central 
to our concern in the next section: whether an increase in the overtime premium would 
lead to a reduction in overtime hours and an increase in employment. 
11
 The percentage change in employment is (0.616/40)(100). We should caution, of course, 
that while our evidence does provide some tentative support for the view that the use of 
overtime has been increasing, the potential employment increase if overtime had not 
increased is a hypothetical maximum figure. , 
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T A B L E 2 
D E T E R M I N A N T S ' O F A V E R A G E W E E K L Y O V E R T I M E H O U R S , A N N U A L 
D A T A , 1956-1977 
All Durable Nondurable 
Statistical Determinant Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Ordinary least squares 
Time trend 
Change in real GNP 
R2 
Durbin-Watson 
Corrected for auto-
correlation 
Time trend 
Change in real GNP 
.045* 
(.014) 
.317 
.940 
.041** 
(.023) 
.036* 
(.012) 
.010* 
(.003) 
.532 
.721 
.028 
(.020) 
.009* 
(.002) 
.048* 
(.019) 
.236 
.985 
.037* .040* 
(.017) (.009) 
.012* 
(.004) 
.456 .472 
.830 .803 
.034* 
(.008) 
.006* 
(.002) 
.626 
.520 
.044 .028 .038* .029* 
(.029) (.026) (.015) (.014) 
.011" 
(.003) 
.005" 
(001) 
Average 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
weekly overtime hours 
2.8 
2.3 
2.0 
2.7 
2.4 
2.4 
2.8 
2.8 
3.1 
3.6 
3.9 
3.4 
3.6 
3.6 
3.0 
2.9 
3.5 
3.8 
3.2 
2.6 
3.1 
3.4 
3.0 
2.4 
1.9 
2.7 
2.4 
2.3 
2.8 
2.9 
3.3 
3.9 
4.3 
3.5 
3.8 
3.8 
3.0 
2.8 
3.6 
4.1 
3.4 
2.5 
3.1 
3.6 
2.4 
2.2 
2.2 
2.7 
2.5 
2.5 
2.7 
2.7 
2.9 
3.2 
3.4 
3.1 
3.3 
3.4 
3.0 
3.0 
3.3 
3.4 
3.0 
2.7 
3.0 
3.1 
NOTES: Asterisk (double asterisk) indicates coefficient statistically different from zero at 
the .05 (.10) level of significance, two-tail test. Time trend equals 1 in 1956. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, 1979 Employment and Training Report of the Pres-
ident (Washington, D.C., 1979). 
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TABLE 3 
COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES, 1956-1977 
(in millions of constant 1972 dollars) 
Ratio of 
Supplements 
Year 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Total 
243.5 
256.5 
258.2 
279.6 
294.9 
303.6 
325.1 
342.9 
368.0 
396.5 
439.3 
471.9. 
519.8 
571.4 
609.2 
650.3 
715.1 
797.7 
873.0 
931.1 
1,036.8 
1,153.4 
Wages and 
Salaries 
228.3 
239.3 
240.5 
258.9 
271.9 
279.5 
298.0 
313.4 
336.1 
362.0 
398.4 
427.5 
469.5 
514.6 
546.5 
580.0 
633.8 
700.9 
763.1 
805.9 
890.1 
983.6 
Supplements 
15.2 
17.2 
17.7 
20.6 
23.0 
24.1 
27.1 
29.5 
31.8 
34.5 
40.9 
44.4 
50.3 
56.8 
62.7 
70.3 
81.4 
96.8 
110.0 
125.2 
146.7 
169.8 
to Toi 
(percei 
6.2 
6.7 
6.9 
7.4 
7.8 
7.9 
8.3 
8.6 
8.6 
8.7 
9.3 
9.4 
9.7 
9.9 
10.3 
10.8 
11.4 
12.1 
12.6 
13.4 
14.1 
14.7 
NOTE: "Compensation of employees" is the income accruing to employees as remuneration 
for their work. "Wages and salaries" consist of the monetary remuneration of employees, 
including the compensation of corporate officers, commissions, tips, and bonuses, and of 
payments in kind, which represent income to the recipients. "Supplements" to wages and 
salaries are employer contributions for social insurance and other labor income. Employer 
contributions for social insurance comprise employer payments under old-age, survivors, 
disability, and hospital insurance, state unemployment insurance, railroad retirement and 
unemployment insurance, government retirement, and a few other minor social insurance 
programs. Other labor income includes employer contributions to private pension, health, 
unemployment, and welfare and privately administered workers' compensation funds; 
compensation for injuries; and directors' fees. 
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Business Sta-
tistics, 1975, p. 6; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Survey of Current Business, January 1979, p. S-2. 
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TABLE 4 
FRINGE BENEFITS AS A PERCENTAGE OF PAYROLL IN 
MANUFACTURING, 1957-1977 
Year 
1957 
1959 
1961 
1963 
1965 
1967 
1969 
1971 
1973 
1975 
1977 
Legally 
Required 
Payments 
(employer's 
share) 
4.1 
4.5 
5.5 
5.9 
5.3 
6.4 
6.8 
6.9 
8.3 
8.8 
9.3 
Pensions, 
Insurance 
5.8 
6.1 
6.8 
6.7 
6.7 
7.0 
7.6 
9.9 
10.2 
11.6 
12.9 
Paid 
Rest 
2.4 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
2.7 
3.0 
3.1 
3.5 
3.5 
3.7 
3.6 
Pay for 
Time 
Not 
Worked 
6.5 
6.7 
7.2 
7.3 
7.2 
7.3 
7.8 
8.6 
8.5 
10.1 
9.2 
Other 
Items 
1.5 
1.6 
1.3 
1.4 
1.7 
1.9 
1.7 
1.7 
1.5 
1.9 
2.3 
Total 
Fringe 
Benefits 
20.3 
21.6 
23.6 
24.2 
23.6 
25.6 
27.0 
30.6 
32.0 
36.1 
37.3 
SOURCE: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Fringe Benefits and Employee Benefits (various 
issues). 
data sets indicate, then, an approximate doubling of the share of fringe 
benefits in total compensation. The increase is due both to an increase 
in employers' legally required insurance payments (social security, un-
employment insurance, workers' compensation, etc.) and to the favor-
able tax treatment of many fringe benefits under the personal income 
and payroll tax provisions, which encourage employers to provide ben-
efits rather than higher wages. 
(The BLS also collects data on employers' expenditure for employee 
compensation, but their data span a shorter number of years. They tell 
a similar story, however. For example, between 1959 and 1974, straight-
time and premium pay in manufacturing fell from 85.4 to 76.9 percent 
of total compensation.)12 
We should caution, however, that not all nonwage forms of com-
pensation are independent of employees' hours of work; those that vary 
with hours do not encourage the substitution of hours for employment. 
Over time, some forms have become "more" related to hours. For 
example, between 1960 and 1978 the Old-Age, Survivors, Disability, 
UU.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1977 Handbook of Labor Sta-
tistics (Washington, D.C., 1977), table 108.; and idem, 1973 Handbook of Labor Statistics 
(Washington, D.C., 1973), table 118. 
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and Health Insurance (OASDHI) maximum taxable earnings rose from 
$4,800 to $17,700. This increase caused the fraction of total covered 
employees with earnings at or above the maximum taxable earnings 
level to fall from 0.28 at the start of the period to 0.10 in 1977. The 
fraction of employees for whom the OASDHI tax could be considered 
not to be related to hours declined by over 50 percent. Focusing on the 
growth of nonwage compensation costs may well overstate the increasing 
incentives employers have to substitute overtime hours for additional 
employment. 
The Overtime Pay Premium, Hours of Work, and Employment: 
Empirical Evidence 
Attempts to estimate the effects of raising the overtime premium from 
time and a half to double time have exploited the fact that although the 
overtime premium is fixed (legislatively) at a point in time, its value 
relative to weekly "quasi-fixed" costs per employee varies substantially 
among establishments because the level of nonwage benefits varies 
among establishments. One of us published the first major published 
study on the subject; this was followed by replications and extensions 
by Nussbaum and Wise, and Solnick and Swimmer.13 These studies used 
individual establishment data from the 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1974 
BLS "Employer Expenditure for Employee Compensation" surveys and 
estimated variants of equations of the form 
OT = a0 + axR + a2X (1) 
where OT is annual overtime hours per employee, R is the ratio of 
measured weekly quasi-fixed nonwage labor costs per employee to the 
overtime wage rate, and X is a vector of other variables expected to 
influence establishments' use of overtime. 
All of these studies confirm that, across establishments, a strong 
positive relationship exists between the use of overtime hours and the 
ratio of weekly nonwage labor costs per employee to the overtime wage 
rate (table 5). From these studies one can simulate what the effect of 
13Ehrenberg, Fringe Benefits; idem, "The Impact of the Overtime Premium on Employ-
ment and Hours in U.S. Industry," Western Economic Journal 9 (June 1971); Joyce 
Nussbaum and Donald Wise, "The Employment Impact of the Overtime Provisions of 
the F.L.S.A." (Final Report, U.S. Department of Labor, Contract J-9-E-6-0105, 1977); 
idem, "The Overtime Pay Premium and Unemployment," in Work Time and Employment; 
Loren Solnick and Gene Swimmer, "Overtime and Fringe Benefits—a Simultaneous 
Equations Approach" (mimeographed, 1978); and Susan Van Atta, "An Analysis of 
Overtime Hours for Production Workers in Manufacturing Industries, 1957-1965" (Ph.D-
diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1967). 
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TABLE 5 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS OF THE WEEKLY NONWAGE LABOR COST 
DIVIDED BY THE OVERTIME W A G E RATE VARIABLE, VARIOUS 
STUDIES 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Ordnance 
Food 
Tobacco 
Textile 
Apparel 
Lumber 
Furniture 
Paper 
Printing 
Chemicals 
Petroleum 
Rubber 
Leather 
Stone-clay-glass 
Primary metals 
Fabricated metals 
Machinery 
Electric equipment 
Transportation 
equipment 
Instruments 
Miscellaneous manu-
facturing 
Mining 
Construction 
Transportation 
Utilities 
Wholesale trade 
Retail trade 
Finance, insurance and 
real estate 
Services 
Ehrenberg 
(1971) 
26.398* 
29.898* 
5.137* 
9.836 
21.390 
85.758* 
25.793* 
25.805* 
40.429* 
11.029 
19.727* 
26.392* 
33.695* 
32.481* 
4.121 
63.146* 
0.343 
30.959* 
42.888* 
7.899 
39.093* 
35.101* 
14.673 
40.370* 
Solnick & 
Swimmer I 
(1978) 
6.73* 
23.53* 
0.00 
4.23 
-2 .50 
11.05* 
3.41 
5.91* 
Solnick & 
Swimmer II 
(1978) 
17.33* 
19.71* 
13.16* 
47.62* 
5.08* 
8.59 
59.41* 
-10.05 
41.18* 
Nussbaum 
& Wise 
(1977) 
15.68* 
14.03* 
19.63* 
35.53* 
13.98 
42.62* 
7.59 
16.43* 
9.84 
30.08* 
29.53* 
19.00* 
-2 .69 
NOTE: Asterisk indicates coefficient statistically different from zero at the .05 level of 
significance. 
SOURCES: Ehrenberg, Fringe Benefits, table 3; Solnick and Swimmer, "Overtime and 
Fringe Benefits," table 2 (for estimate I) and table 3 (for estimate II); Nussbaum and 
Wise, "Employment Impact," table 4.3. 
275 
OVERTIME PAY PROVISIONS 
increasing the overtime premium would be on overtime hours if one 
assumes that employers fully comply with the legislation and that the 
change in the premium affects neither straight-time wage rates nor the 
levels of weekly quasi-fixed nonwage labor costs. Moreover, if one also 
assumes that all of the reduction in overtime would be converted to new 
full-time positions, one can simulate what the effect on the employment 
level would be. We have tabulated the implied results from such sim-
ulations in table 6; they suggest maximum employment increases in the 
range of 0.3 to 4.0 percent.14 
These estimates clearly overstate the increase in the number of full-
time employment positions that would go initially to nonemployed in-
dividuals. They assume wage elasticities of demand to be zero; they 
ignore the possibility of increased moonlighting by existing employees; 
they ignore problems relating to skill mismatches and indivisibilities; 
they assume full compliance with the legislation; and they ignore' the 
possibility that the levels or rates of growth of straight-time wages and 
fringe benefits might be adjusted downward. Each of these factors will 
reduce the employment creation effects of an increase in the overtime 
premium; let us examine current knowledge of each factor. 
14
 These estimates are derived as follows: The decrease in annual overtime hours per 
employee is given from (1) by AOT = a,Ai? where AR is the change in R caused by the 
increase in the premium. If total man-hours demanded remained constant and new full-
time positions averaging 2,000 hours a year were created, the total number of new jobs 
created in an industry would be A£ = (-AO772,000)£, where £ is the initial industry 
employment level. In percentage terms, %A£ = (A£/£)100 = (-AO7)/20. So, for ex-
ample, since AOT = -32 in Ehrenberg (Fringe Benefits), the resulting simulated %A£ 
was 1.6 percent. 
We must caution, however, that a number of statistical problems associated with the 
studies cause us to conclude that their results should be considered extremely tentative. 
First, none took account of the fact that reported overtime hours could not be negative 
and that some establishments use zero overtime. Use of ordinary least squares leads to 
biased estimates under these circumstances; an estimation method such as Tobit analysis 
is required. 
Second, it may be argued that to the extent that overtime hours are perceived as 
being unavoidable by employers, they can try to reduce their overtime costs, and total 
labor costs, by offering their employees compensation packages which substitute fringes 
for higher straight-time wages. If this occurs, a positive correlation would be induced 
between R and OT; however, the direction of causation would run from OT to R. To 
estimate the effect of R on OT accurately requires a simultaneous equations approach. 
Only Solnick and Swimmer have attempted to do this; however, their specification of the 
nonwage labor cost/overtime wage rate (/?) equation was seriously incomplete. 
As a final note, Nussbaum and Wise did estimate employment effects directly using 
mean values of industry variables as the units of observation. (Nussbaum and Wise, 
"Employment Impact.") We have serious doubts both about the validity of such inter-
industry equations and their particular specification. Furthermore, the underlying regres-
sion coefficients upon which their estimates were based were all statistically insignificant. 
Thus, very little confidence should be placed in the precision of their 2.0 percent estimate 
(table 6). 
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TABLE 6 
UPPER-BOUND ESTIMATES OF THE CHANGES IN FULL-TIME 
EMPLOYMENT FROM INCREASING THE OVERTIME PREMIUM FROM 
TIME AND A HALF TO DOUBLE TIME, VARIOUS STUDIES 
Study 
Ehrenberg (1971) 
Nussbaum and Wise 
(1977) 
Solnick and Swimmer 
(1978) 
Group 
1966 manufacturing 
production workers 
1968 manufacturing 
production workers 
1970 manufacturing 
production workers 
1972 manufacturing 
production workers 
1974 manufacturing 
production workers 
1968-1974 pooled 
manufacturing inter-
industry data 
employment equation 
estimated directly 
1972 private nonfarm 
nonsupervisory 
workers (OLSa 
analysis) 
1972 private nonfarm 
nonsupervisory 
workers (3SLSb 
analysis) 
Maximum 
Absolute 
Change 
218,500 
491,400 
487,700 
361,900 
549,700 
320,000 
159,264 
1,521,664 
Maximum 
Percentage 
Change 
1.6 
3.7 
3.7 
2.8 
4.0 
2.0 
0.3 
3.1 
' Ordinary least squares. 
b
 Three-stage least squares. 
SOURCES: Ehrenberg, "Impact of Overtime Premium," table 3; Nussbaum and Wise, 
"Employment Impact," tables 4.11A, 4.11B, 4.11C, and 4.11; and Solnick and Swimmer, 
"Overtime and Fringe Benefits," table 5. 
Nonzero Wage Elasticities. The estimates in table 6 assume that the 
demand for man-hours is completely inelastic. That is, they ignore the 
fact that an increase in the overtime premium raises the average cost 
per man-hour of labor; this may induce a shift to more capital-intensive 
methods of production and, to the extent that the cost increase is passed 
on to consumers in the form of higher prices, a reduction in the quantity 
of output demanded. Both the substitution and the scale effect should 
277 
OVERTIME PAY PROVISIONS 
lead to a decline in the number of man-hours employed by employers. 
We can roughly estimate the magnitude of these effects. Daniel 
Hamermesh has surveyed time-series estimates of the wage elasticity of 
demand for labor and has concluded that a reasonable estimate for the 
long-run (four-quarters) elasticity is -0.3.15 Suppose that before an in-
crease in overtime premium the standard workweek was forty hours and 
employees averaged three hours of overtime per week. Suppose also 
that the increase in the overtime premium induced a reduction of 1.2 
hours of overtime per week; the latter figure would lead to a 3 percent 
increase in full-time employment //"total man-hours remained constant. 
The reduction in overtime, coupled with the increase in the premium 
to double time, would cause the average hourly (including overtime) 
wage rate to rise by about 0.8 percent.16 This would imply a 0.24 percent 
decline in total man-hours and, since hours had declined by 2.8 percent, 
an increase in employment of roughly 2.56 percent. Thus, the estimated 
maximum number of new jobs created falls by about 0.5 percentage 
points if one accounts for nonzero wage elasticities of demand.17 Of 
course, if a larger wage elasticity is more appropriate, the estimate of 
employment gain would be reduced accordingly. 
Moonlighting. The employment gain estimates cited in table 6 also ne-
glect supply-side responses of currently employed workers, who would 
simultaneously face an increase in the overtime premium and a reduction 
in their hours of work. One possible response is increased moonlighting 
at part-time jobs; this would further reduce the creation of new jobs for 
the unemployed. 
Previous investigators have discounted the possibility that increased 
moonlighting would be a serious problem.18 Among the evidence rel-
evant to this point is that there is currently very little moonlighting in 
the economy (less than 5 percent of all employed workers had second 
jobs in 1978), many moonlighters are individuals whose primary jobs 
15
 Daniel Hamermesh, "Econometric Studies of Labor Demand and Their Implications 
for Policy," Journal of Human Resources (Fall 1976): 507-25. It should be noted that 
virtually all of the studies he cites use man-hours as the measure of labor and fail to 
include nonwage labor costs in their analyses. 
16
 The percentage wage gain is given by {[40W + (2.0)(1.8)W]/41.8}/{[40W + (1.5)(3.0)W]/ 
43}. 
17
 As Solomon Polachek notes in his conference comments, there is a certain inconsistency 
in the procedure we have used here. It clearly would be preferable to estimate hours/man 
and employment level equations together as part of a simultaneous system and then to 
derive the estimated employment effects directly from this system. Unfortunately, there 
exists no individual establishment data set which permits this, and as we noted in footnote 
14, we are highly suspicious of the validity of the one interindustry study that attempted 
to do so. 
18
 See Department of Labor, Premium Payments for Overtime. 
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are in agriculture, and moonlighters tend to be employed in lower skill-
level positions than their primary jobs; the latter reduces the attrac-
tiveness of moonlighting as a substitute for overtime.19 
We would caution, however, that the small number of individuals 
currently holding second jobs is not indicative of the potential expansion 
in moonlighting that might occur if overtime hours were severely re-
stricted. Between 1973 and 1978, roughly 27 percent of all wage and 
salary workers with only one job regularly worked more than forty hours 
a week.20 If overtime were restricted, many of them might seek second 
jobs. Clearly, evidence on the overtime-moonlighting relationship is 
required. 
Two recent studies have dealt with the effect of weekly hours of 
work on the moonlighting decision.21 Using their data, we can simulate 
the effects of a simultaneous reduction in overtime hours and increase 
in the overtime premium on both the probability of an individual's 
moonlighting and his or her average hours on the second job if moon-
lighting does occur. We have conducted such a simulation using Shishko 
and Rostker's estimates, and our analyses suggest that a simultaneous 
reduction in overtime hours of two hours per week and increase in the 
overtime premium to double time would lead to an increase of approx-
imately 6 percent in moonlighting hours.22 Given that moonlighting is 
19
 See Carl Rosenfeld, "Multiple Jobholding Holds Steady in 1978," Monthly Labor Re-
view 102 (February 1979): 59-61; and Scott Brown, "Moonlighting Increases Sharply in 
1977," Monthly Labor Review 101 (January 1978): 27-30, for data on multiple job holding. 
See Jeffrey Perloff and Michael Wachter, "Work Sharing, Unemployment, and the Rate 
of Economic Growth," in Work Time and Employment, for analyses of the likely effects 
of moonlighting on work-sharing arrangements. 
20George D. Stamas, "Long Hours and Premium Pay, May 1978," Monthly Labor Review 
102 (May 1979): 41-45. 
"Robert Shishko and Bernard Rostker, "The Economics of Multiple Job Holding," 
American Economic Review 66 (June 1976): 298-308; and John F. Connell, "Multiple Job 
Holding and Marginal Tax Rates," National Tax Journal 32 (March 1979). 
^Details of our calculations are found in the appendix. We should note that neither of 
the published studies cited above is completely satisfactory in our view. They both assume 
that overtime hours of work on individuals' primary jobs are solely employer determined 
and that individuals do not have the right to refuse overtime. In fact, data from the 1977 
Quality of Employment Survey, conducted by the Michigan Survey Research Center for 
the U.S. Department of Labor, indicate that for 44 percent of the workers in the sample 
who regularly worked overtime, it was "mostly up to the worker whether he or she works 
overtime" and for another 29 percent it was "mostly up to the employer, but the worker 
can refuse without penalty." Indeed, only for 16 percent was the decision solely up to the 
employer and could the worker not refuse overtime without a penalty (Robert Quinn and 
Graham Staines, The 1977 Quality of Employment Survey: Descriptive Statistics [Ann 
Arbor, Mich., 1977], pp. 90-91). 
While these data may overstate the freedom that individual workers actually have 
in choosing overtime hours, they do suggest that the relationship between overtime hours 
and moonlighting is much more complicated than the models used in previous research 
suggest. Therefore, our estimate of the likely increase in moonlighting that would result 
from an increase in the overtime premium should be considered extremely tentative. 
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in any case infrequent, our crude calculation suggests that increased 
moonlighting is unlikely to be a substantial deterrent to the employment 
creation effects of an increase in the overtime premium. 
The Skill Distributions of the Unemployed and Those Who Work Over-
time. The estimates of maximum employment gain cited in table 6 as-
sume that the skill distributions of the unemployed and those who work 
overtime are sufficiently similar to permit all of the reduction in overtime 
to be converted into new full-time employment. That is, they assume 
that the skill mix of the unemployed does not constrain employers' 
employment-hours decisions. 
Data are available on the occupational distributions of both the 
experienced unemployed and those working overtime for premium pay. 
We have tabulated these data for 1978 in table 7. At first glance, these 
data do not suggest that at the aggregate one-digit occupational level 
skill mismatches are likely to limit employment/hours substitution. Only 
for craftsmen and kindred workers and transportation operatives are 
the number of experienced unemployed in an occupation as low as 30 
percent of the number working overtime (column 5). Since even the 
most optimistic estimates in table 6 suggests a maximum employment 
effect of 4 percent, one is tempted to conclude that the "skill-mix" 
problem is not a serious constraint. 
Although these data are suggestive, one should not place too much 
faith in this conclusion. The use of aggregate one-digit occupational data 
may obscure more than it reveals. The range of narrow occupational 
categories within each broad category is enormous; for example, the 
craftsmen category includes bakers, carpenters, tailors, and stationary 
engineers. To draw any meaningful conclusions about potential "skill-
mix" bottlenecks requires that analyses be performed at a more detailed 
occupational level. Moreover, the relevant question is how these nar-
rowly defined skill distributions contrast at the local labor market level. 
Until such analyses are undertaken, one must remain agnostic about the 
likely biases due to the "mismatch" problem. 
Indivisibilities. The maximum employment gain estimates ignore two 
types of indivisibilities. On the one hand, there are indivisibilities as-
sociated with an integrated team production process. Specialization and 
division of labor within an enterprise may give rise to time comple-
mentarities among workers and between workers and capital that pre-
vent the substitution of additional employment for hours.23 For example, 
a firm in a continuous process industry may regularly work its existing 
work force an average of two hours a week overtime by scheduling three 
23
 Rosen, "Supply of Work Schedules," pp. 145-75. 
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TABLE 7 
OVERTIME H O U R S AND UNEMPLOYMENT, BY OCCUPATION, 1978 
AH occupations 
White collar 
Professional 
and techni-
cal 
Managers and 
administra-
tors 
Sales 
Clerical 
Blue collar 
Craft and 
kindred 
Operatives 
Transpor-
tation oper-
atives 
Nonfarm la-
borers 
Service workers 
Farm workers 
No previous expe-
rience (new en-
trants) 
Total 
Overtime 
Workers" 
(in 
thousands) 
8,141 
2,412 
676 
449 
201 
1,087 
5,152 
2,099 
1,908 
617 
527 
540 
33 
— 
Total 
Unem-
ployed 
6,047 
1,717 
381 
214 
256 
866 
2,323 
603 
960 
195 
566 
1,029 
110 
868 
Share of 
Overtime 
Workers 
— 
0.30 
0.08 
0.06 
0.03 
0.13 
0.63 
0.26 
0.23 
0.08 
0.06 
0.07 
0.00 
— 
Share of 
Unem-
ployed 
— 
0.28 
0.06 
0.04 
0.04 
0.14 
0.38 
0.10 
0.16 
0.03 
0.09 
0.17 
0.02 
0.14 
Ratio of 
Unem-
ployed to 
Overtime 
Workers" 
0.74 
0.72 
0.56 
0.48 
1.27 
0.80 
0.45 
0.29 
0.50 
0.32 
1.07 
1.91 
3.33 
— 
* Number of full-time wage and salary workers who worked forty-one hours or more and 
received premium pay in May 1978. 
b
 Total unemployed divided by number working overtime in the occupation (column 2/ 
column 1). 
SOURCES: Stamas, "Long Hours and Premium Pay," table 3, p. 43; and U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1979, table 11. 
shifts of forty hours and one of forty-eight (24 x 7 = 168 hours). If 
men/machine ratios are relatively fixed, at least in the short run, it would 
be difficult to substitute new full-time employment for hours in such an 
industry. 
On the other hand, the employment estimates also ignore indivisi-
bilities associated with establishment size. While a large establishment 
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may have the option of substituting one new full-time employee for 
twenty employees who each work two hours/week overtime, small es-
tablishments with only a few employees working overtime may not face 
such options. Following this line of reasoning, an increase in the over-
time premium might induce a substitution of additional employment for 
overtime hours in large establishments; however, indivisibilities might 
prevent such substitutions in smaller establishments and result in those 
establishments' being placed at a relative cost disadvantage, //this were 
the likely outcome, one might consider making any increase in the 
overtime premium applicable only to establishments above a minimum 
size; historically there have been size class exemptions under various 
provisions of the FLSA for similar reasons.24 
One of us has, in fact, attempted to ascertain if the relationship 
between the use of overtime hours and the ratio of quasi-fixed nonwage 
costs to the overtime wage rate does vary across size classes of estab-
lishments.25 For the nonmanufacturing industries, the relationship was 
fairly stable across all size classes of establishments within each major 
nonmanufacturing industry; small establishments appeared to face the 
same employment-hours trade-off as did large establishments.26 The 
results for the manufacturing sector were quite different, however. For 
these industries, the marginal effect of an increase in the overtime pre-
mium on hours did vary across size classes of establishments within each 
two-digit industry. Moreover, there was no consistent pattern across 
industries in the way the magnitude and the statistical significance of 
the effect varied with establishment size. Indeed, in several cases, it was 
the smallest size classes of establishments for which the largest marginal 
effects were observed. Since the magnitude and statistical significance 
of the relationship between the use of overtime hours and the ratio of 
quasi-fixed nonwage costs to the overtime wage rate does not appear 
to vary across size classes of establishments in any systematic way across 
manufacturing industries, it would not appear reasonable to institute a 
set of size class exemptions for any increase in the overtime premium.27 
Compliance with the Overtime Pay Provisions. An additional reason why 
24
 Exemptions for reason of size have declined over time. 
" S e e Ehrenberg, Fringe Benefits, chaps. 5 and 6. 
26
 In that study, establishments were grouped into eight size classes: fewer than 20 em-
ployees; 20-49; 50-99; 100-249; 250-499; 500-999; 1,000-2,499; and 2,500 or more em-
ployees. 
27
 It is possible that the sample sizes used in the manufacturing industry analyses reported 
in Ehrenberg, Fringe Benefits, were too small (an average of 60 establishments per two-
digit industry as compared to an average of 150 in each nonmanufacturing industry) to 
estimate precisely how the effects varied with establishment size. This is another area in 
which more research is needed. 
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the estimates presented in table 6 may overstate the magnitude of the 
increase in employment that would result from an increase in the over-
time premium to double time relates to the issue of compliance with 
the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Although analyses of the effects 
of labor market legislation typically assume that legislation is fully com-
plied with, noncompliance is always a potential problem.28 Since an 
increase in the overtime premium would increase the amount employers 
save by not complying with the legislation, such an increase may well 
lead to a reduced compliance rate. This would moderate the actual 
decline in overtime hours and further reduce the positive employment 
effects of the legislation. 
A number of data sources provide some information on compliance 
with overtime legislation. A U.S. Department of Labor compliance 
survey conducted in 1965 indicated that 30 percent of establishments in 
which overtime was worked were in violation of the overtime provisions 
of the FLSA and 5.9 percent of the employees working overtime were 
not paid in accordance with the overtime provisions (see table 8). More 
recently, Labor Department investigations in FY ,1977 of complaints of 
violations under the FLSA found a greater dollar volume of violations 
of the overtime pay provisions than they did of the minimum wage 
provisions.29 Finally, data from the annual May supplements to the 
Current Population Surveys indicate that between 1973 and 1978 less 
than 43 percent of full-time wage and salary workers who worked forty-
one or more hours a week at one job reported receiving premium pay.30 
While many of these individuals may work in noncovered employment, 
these data do suggest that noncompliance with the overtime premium 
provisions may be a serious problem.31 
Knowledge of the correlates of noncompliance is important for 
policy makers. Such information can serve as a guide to the allocation 
of the limited resources the government has to ensure compliance. More-
over, if noncompliance is found to be widespread, policy makers may 
decide to push for an increase in the resources devoted to compliance 
investigations and also for an increase in the penalties for noncompli-
ance. Finally, information on the relationship between compliance and 
individuals' wage rates may shed some light on the question whether 
^Orley Ashenfelter and Robert S. Smith, "Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law," 
Journal of Political Economy 87 (April 1979): 333-50. 
29
 Department of Labor, Premium Payments for Overtime. These data refer to fiscal year 
1967. 
^Stamas, "Long Hours and Premium Pay," p. 41. 
31
 Of course, as table 1 indicates, only 58 percent of all wage and salary workers are 
covered by the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Since one may reasonably conjecture 
that noncovered workers are more likely to work overtime, these data should be considered 
only suggestive. 
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V I O L A T I O N O F O V E R T I M E P R O V I S I O N S O F T H E FLSA, 1965 
(percent) 
Category 
All industries 
Manufacturing 
Food and tobacco 
Textiles, apparel, and leather 
Lumber and furniture 
Paper, printing, and publishing 
Chemicals, petroleum, rubber 
Stone, clay, and glass 
Metals and metal products 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Nonmanufacturing 
Mining 
Construction 
Transportation, communications, 
and utilities 
Wholesale trade, food and farm 
products 
Wholesale trade, all other 
Retail trade 
Finance and insurance 
Real estate 
Business service 
Other industries 
All regions 
Northeast 
South 
Middle West 
West 
All sizes of establishments 
Fewer than 10 employees 
10-19 employees 
20-49 employees 
50-99 employees 
100 or more employees 
Establishments 
in Violation* 
30 
26 
37 
24 
30 
25 
27 
27 
22 
19 
32 
26 
29 
17 
37 
40 
47 
27 
37 
29 
46 
30 
22 
37 
29 
30 
30 
31 
38 
33 
28 
25 
Workers Not Paid 
in Accordance with 
Provisions for 
Overtime HOursb 
5.9 
3.6 
8.1 
3.3 
3.6 
3.6 
9.6 
4.4 
1.7 
3.1 
9.8 
7.0 
8.2 
4.5 
11.7 
15.2 
10.8 
11.7 
39.2 
8.9 
10.7 
5.9 
3.3 
9.5 
4.3 
7.6 
5.9 
24.9 
10.9 
11.1 
4.7 
2.6 
a
 As a percentage of all establishments in which overtime was worked. 
b
 As a percentage of all employees working overtime. 
SOURCE: Author's calculations, based on data from U.S. Department of Labor, Wage 
and Hour and Public Contracts Division, 1965 Compliance Survey (Washington, D.C, 
1966), tables 9, 10, 11, 17, and 18. 
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increasing the overtime premium will lead to a reduction in the com-
pliance rate. 
Orley Ashenfelter and Robert S. Smith have recently presented 
and estimated a model of compliance with the minimum wage.32 We are 
now building and estimating a similar model for the overtime pay pro-
visions of the FLSA. Although we have not yet developed a complete 
formal model, several of the factors likely to influence compliance seem 
obvious. For example, compliance is probably greater in unionized es-
tablishments, in situations where workers have permanent attachment 
to a firm, in noncompetitive industries where employers can pass cost 
increases on to consumers in the form of higher prices, in situations 
where workers have better knowledge of their rights (perhaps higher 
education levels), and in areas where labor markets are tight (low un-
employment) and employers are trying to retain employees. The esti-
mates we ultimately obtain should provide some information on whether 
noncompliance would seriously reduce the employment-creation effects 
of an increase in the overtime premium. 
Compensating Wage and Fringe Benefit Adjustments. The final problem 
with the employment gain simulations reported in table 6 is that they 
ignore the possibility that an increase in the overtime premium may lead 
to compensating adjustments in straight-time wages or fringe benefits.33 
For example, suppose that firms and their employees are initially in an 
equilibrium situation in which overtime hours are regularly scheduled. 
Now from employers' perspectives, one plausible response to a legislated 
increase in the overtime premium is for them to attempt to reduce the 
level (or rate of growth) of straight-time wages and fringe benefits. If 
they are successful and the total compensation of workers for the initial 
equilibrium level of hours (including overtime) remains the same as it 
would have been in the absence of the legislated change, one may argue 
that employers would have no incentive to reduce their use of overtime 
hours. 
This argument is simplistic. From the employer's perspective what 
is relevant in the determination of overtime hours is not the overall level 
of labor costs but rather the ratio (R) of quasi-fixed weekly labor costs 
per employee (F) to the overtime wage rate (WP), the product of the 
straight-time wage (W) and the overtime premium (P): 
R = F/WP (2) 
32
 Ashenfelter and Smith, "Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law." 
33
 This section was "provoked" by stimulating comments from Gregg Lewis and Finis 
Welch. Our conclusions here are strictly our own, however, and do not reflect their views. 
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The simulations reported in table 6 assume that an increase in P 
induces no change in either W or F. What is certainly true is that if a 
compensating decline in straight-time wages occurs, the decline in R will 
be smaller and the resulting decrease in hours and increase in employ-
ment smaller in absolute value than the simulations reported in table 
6. However, as equation (2) indicates, a compensating decline in the 
quasi-fixed costs, F, would cause the actual decline in R to be larger, 
and the resulting decrease in hours and increase in employment would 
be larger in absolute value than the simulations indicate, ceteris paribus. 
Thus, one cannot predict a priori what the direction of the bias is here; 
it depends upon the extent, if any, to which compensating adjustments 
occur in both straight-time wages and fringe benefits. 
Evidence on the magnitudes, if any, of these compensating ad-
justments is required before one can conclude that their omission sub-
stantially biases the estimated employment gains that would result from 
increasing the overtime premium. As part of our research, we will at-
tempt to use the Employer Expenditure for Employee Compensation 
data to test whether an inverse relationship exists across establishments 
between straight-time wage and fringe benefit and the magnitude of the 
overtime premium, ceteris paribus. Unfortunately, cross-section varia-
tions in the overtime premium are due both to collective bargaining 
agreements and to differences in coverage under the FLSA; this may 
make it difficult to distinguish the effects of legislated and collectively 
bargained differences in the premium.34 
Should the Overtime Provisions of the FLSA Be Amended? 
Previous studies have demonstrated that, across establishments, a strong 
positive relationship exists between the use of overtime hours and the 
ratio of weekly nonwage labor costs per employee to the overtime wage 
rate. They suggest that an increase in the overtime premium to double 
time would substantially reduce the use of overtime hours if compliance 
with the legislation did not change and if straight-time wage rates were 
not affected. Moreover, to the extent that the reduction in hours could 
be converted into new full-time employment, such a change in the leg-
34
 It seems somewhat ironic that for years researchers have analyzed the employment 
effects of minimum wage changes without considering the possibility that there might be 
none because firms may respond to an increase in the minimum wage by reducing nonwage 
forms of compensation for low-wage workers. Of course, one might argue that there is 
no room for an increase in the minimum wage to reduce other forms of compensation 
that low-skill workers receive, because such compensation is already close to zero. Never-
theless, we believe that this too remains an empirical issue. For a more detailed discussion 
of this point, see Walter Wessels, "The Effects of Minimum Wages in the Presence of 
Fringe Benefits: An Expanded Model," Economic Inquiry (forthcoming). 
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islation has the potential to increase employment by several percentage 
points. However, whether this increase in employment would actually 
occur and whether the new jobs would go to currently nonemployed 
individuals are another matter. We have discussed a number of factors 
that might reduce the job creation aspects of the proposal; they include 
nonzero wage elasticities of demand for labor, the possibility of increased 
moonlighting, the similarity or lack of similarity between the skill dis-
tributions of the unemployed and of those who work overtime, indivis-
ibilities associated with integrated team production processes and with 
establishment size, the possibility of increased noncompliance with the 
legislation, and the possibility that compensating variations in straight-
time wages might occur. We have documented the available evidence 
on these points wherever possible. In a number of cases the evidence 
is simply nonexistent or too incomplete to make reasoned judgments, 
however. We plan to undertake empirical research on several of the 
areas during the next year and will reserve our final judgments about 
the wisdom of increasing the overtime premium until our research is 
completed. Nevertheless, we can offer a number of general conclusions 
at this time. 
First, we would emphasize that even if one ultimately can show that 
increasing the overtime premium would lead to a substantial increase 
in employment of individuals who were initially not employed, it does 
not necessarily follow that the policy should be implemented. Presum-
ably other policies, such as the use of marginal employee tax credits, 
could accomplish the same goal.35 However, the distribution of costs 
associated with the two types of legislation would be different. In the 
former case, the costs would be borne by consumers of products pro-
duced in industries where overtime was worked (higher prices), owners 
of these industries (lower profits), and employees (less overtime, but 
at higher pay). In the latter case, the costs would be borne primarily by 
taxpayers and consumers in general, in the form of higher taxes to fund 
the deficit induced by the tax credit and/or higher rates of inflation. In 
general, we need benefit/cost analyses of the alternative policies de-
signed to accomplish a given objective (such as these two), not merely 
evidence that a single policy option will have a postulated impact. 
Second, as discussed earlier, an overtime pay premium may be 
thought of as a tax to make employers bear the full marginal social cost 
of their hours decisions. In the premium's absence their calculations 
ignore the costs borne by society because of unemployment. It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that the revenue that would accrue from 
35
 See Robert Eisner, "Employment Taxes and Subsidies," in Work Time and Employ-
ment. 
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any increase in the "tax" should be distributed to employees in the form 
of higher premium pay for overtime. Indeed, over the years several 
proposals have suggested that the revenue from any increase in the 
"tax" on overtime go directly to the unemployed, in the form of con-
tributions either to the unemployment insurance fund and/or to em-
ployment and training program budgets.36 Such proposals make a good 
deal of sense to us. Unless it can be demonstrated both that market 
imperfections prevent existing employed workers from freely choosing 
the length of their workweeks and that the existing overtime premium 
does not fully compensate these workers for the disutility associated 
with long workweeks, then no increase in the premium paid to em-
ployees is justified. One can thus logically be in favor of raising the 
"tax" paid by employers when they use overtime hours but not in favor 
of raising the overtime premium paid to employees. 
Finally, one may more generally ask why the FLSA regulates only 
two dimensions of the hours relationship, the number of hours after 
which the premium goes into effect and its level, and whether the leg-
islation should be extended to other dimensions? In their legislation, 
several European countries require either prior governmental approval 
for overtime and/or that employees give their consent to working over-
time.37 The bill to amend the FLSA (H.R. 1784), introduced into Con-
gress on February 1,1979, by Congressman Conyers, contained a similar 
provision that would prohibit mandatory assignment of overtime. 
As noted earlier, a common rationale for many forms of protective 
labor legislation is that they are attempts to correct for failures of private 
markets. These failures may occur for a variety of reasons, including 
market imperfections that limit workers' choices and cause a divergence 
between private and social costs. Legislation regulating overtime hours 
can easily be analyzed in this framework, for even if both employers 
and their employees were satisfied with long workweeks and no premium 
pay for overtime, their private calculations ignore the social costs of 
unemployment. An overtime premium can be thought of as a tax that 
attempts to make employers bear the full marginal social cost of their 
decisions about work hours. Its intent (as with all marginal taxes) is to 
reduce the use of overtime hours and stimulate employment growth. 
36
 See Department of Labor, Premium Payments for Overtime, Washington, D . C , 1967. 
More recently Kenneth Morris, representing the United Auto Workers, argued in favor 
of paying part or all of the additional premium into the unemployment insurance fund. 
See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the 
Committee on Education and Labor, Hearings on H.R. 1784, 96th Congress, 2d sess., 
1980, pp. 41-49. 
37
 See National Board for Prices and Incomes, Hours of Work, Overtime and Shiftwork, 
report no. 161 (London, 1970), pp. 42-49 and supplements, pp. 92-116. Employee consent 
to overtime is required in both Belgium and the Netherlands. 
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The payment of the premium directly to employed workers is justified 
in this framework if market imperfections prevent workers from freely 
choosing their desired workweeks and force them to work "excessively" 
long hours. The payment is then seen as an attempt to reduce their 
disutility from long workweeks. 
Proposals to legislate prohibitions against mandatory overtime, such 
as Congressman Conyers's, can be viewed in this context as being based 
upon the belief that market imperfections persist in the labor market 
and that the overtime premium does not fully compensate employees 
for mandatory overtime. One may, however, question if markets have 
failed here. As noted earlier, for only 16 percent of the individuals who 
worked overtime in the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey was the 
overtime hours decision made unilaterally by their employer and was 
overtime mandatory (in the sense that employees who refused it suffered 
a penalty).38 Moreover, roughly 20 percent of employees covered by 
major collective bargaining agreements in 1976 had explicit provisions 
in their contracts that gave them the right to refuse overtime (table 9). 
(Over 50 percent of the workers covered by this provision were in the 
transportation equipment industry, however.) 
To the extent that labor markets are competitive and establishments 
offer a variety of overtime hours provisions (that is, employer deter-
mines, employee determines, penalty for refusal, etc.), an unabashed 
neoclassical economist would argue that compensating wage differentials 
should arise. That is, establishments which offered "distasteful" man-
datory overtime provisions would have to pay higher straight-time wages 
to attract labor than establishments in which such provisions did not 
occur. If fully compensating wage differentials exist, no case for legis-
lated prohibitions against mandatory overtime is present. 
As with most problems in economics, the case for or against such 
prohibitions can not be decided at the theoretical level. Rather, empirical 
evidence is needed on the extent to which employees are or are not 
compensated, in the form of higher straight-time wage rates, for being 
required to work overtime. Once this evidence is available, policy mak-
ers can debate whether the estimated wage premiums are sufficient or 
a legislated prohibition on mandatory overtime is required. In future 
research we plan to use data from the 1977 Quality of Employment 
Survey to estimate the extent to which the various overtime assignment 
provisions (employee choice, employer assignment, penalty for refusal, 
etc.) are currently associated with market wage differentials. We intend 
to estimate wage equations from these survey data, including the various 
assignment provisions as explanatory variables. Our analyses will at-
38
 See footnote 22 above. 
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TABLE 9 
OVERTIME PROVISIONS IN M A J O R COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS, JULY 1, 1976 
Number of 
Agreements 
Workers 
Covered 
Total number of agreements 
Daily overtime provisions 
Time and one-half 
Double time 
After 8 hours/day 
Weekly overtime provisions 
Time and one-half 
Double time 
After less than 40 hours/week 
Overtime outside regularly scheduled hours 
Graduated overtime rates 
Equal distribution of overtime 
Right to refuse overtime2 
Premium pay for weekends 
Saturday not part of regular workweek 
At more than time and one-half 
Sunday not part of regular workweek 
At more than time and one-half 
Saturday part of regular workweek 
Sunday part of regular workweek 
1,570 
1,393 
1,243 
105 
1,268 
997 
942 
33 
54 
570 
370 
661 
280 
1,430 
880 
171 
1,211 
871 
39 
193 
6,741,750 
6,069,750 
5,552,000 
350,800 
5,266,650 
4,393,750 
4,222,300 
106,450 
209,350 
2,153,300 
1,518,350 
2,832,700 
1,346,650 
6,070,400 
3,741,400 
533,400 
5,136,200 
3,461,550 
104,400 
1,545,850 
a
 Over 50 percent of the workers covered by this provision are in the transportation 
equipment industry. 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 201, Characteristics of Major Collective 
Bargaining Agreements, July 1, 1976 (Washington, D.C., February 1979). 
tempt to "correct" for the possibility that individuals with preferences 
for long hours of work are attracted to firms which offer "mandatory 
overtime provisions" by using techniques described by Heckman.39 The 
problem here is to correct for sample selection bias; wage premiums 
may not be reflected in the "uncorrected" data if workers with pref-
erences for longer hours of work systematically seek out firms which 
expect their employees to work overtime and thus have "mandatory" 
overtime provisions. 
We hope such analyses will provide policy makers with useful in-
formation on this issue. Our discussion has neglected the whole issue 
of what should determine whether a particular condition of employment 
39
 James Heckman, "Sample Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica 47 (January 
1979): 153-61. 
290 
••£ 
EHRENBERG AND SCHUMANN 
is determined through collective bargaining and/or through government 
intervention. Given the incomplete collective bargaining coverage in the 
United States, if market imperfections do occur, a case for potential 
government intervention is usually present. In the absence of such in-
formation, we would be extremely reluctant to support legislated pro-
hibitions against mandatory overtime. 
Appendix: Simulations on the Effect of a Simultaneous Increase in the 
Overtime Premium and Reduction in Overtime Hours 
Robert Shishko and Bernard Rostker specify a model of the form: 
hm = a0 + axWm + a2Wp + a3hp + aj + aJC + E (Al) 
where: 
hm = weekly hours on second job 
Wm = hourly wage rate on the second job 
Wp = hourly wage rate on the primary job 
hp = weekly hours on the primary job 
I= (Wm - Wp)hp for Specification A 
/ = Wphp + Z for Specification B 
Z = labor income earned by members of the family other than 
the head of the household 
X = a vector of descriptive variables including age and family size 
e = an error term 
Since the distribution of moonlighting hours is truncated at zero hours, 
Shishko and Rostker utilize Tobit analyses. If, for expositional conven-
ience, we place all of the explanatory variables in a vector X, the mode 
may be written: 
hm = a'X + E 
Now in the Tobit model, a change in any of the predetermined 
variables, say Xk, is given by: 
£-*•(?) (A2) 
where ak is the coefficient of Xk and 4> (•) is the cumulative normal 
density function.40 Similarly, the elasticity is given by: 
hK X±
 = atXMa'X/a) 
SXk hm hm 
40More precisely, [bE(hm\X)]/bXk = ak &(a'X)lcr. This is not conditional on hm. It rep-
resents the behavioral response of the "average individuals" being greater than zero. 
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Shishko and Rostker report in their table 3 elasticity estimates for all 
of their variables. For our purposes, the important elasticities [(5/zm/ 
bXk)(Xk/hJ] are: 
Predetermined Specification A Specification B 
Variable 
Wp -0.126 -0.862 
hp -1.406 -1.255 
/ 0.074 -0.175 
Clearly, the percentage change in moonlighting hours for any spec-
ified percentage change in each of these predetermined variables can 
be approximated by: 
Aft (hh W\ &W 
m
 hm \hWp hj wp 
U , hj hp +{*I hj I (A4) 
Since the terms in parentheses are the elasticities tabulated above, all 
that remains to be indicated is the percentage changes in Wp, hp, and 
/ induced by a change in the overtime premium. 
Now suppose that weekly hours on an individual's primary job fall 
from forty-four hours per week to forty-two when the overtime premium 
increases from time and one-half to double time. Define the mean wage 
on the primary job as: 
Wp = [(regular hours)(regular wages) 
+ (overtime hours)(overtime premium)(regular wage)] (A5) 
+ [(regular hours) + (overtime hours)] 
If the overtime premium goes into effect after forty hours per week, 
then since the mean value of the straight-time primary wage in Shishko 
and Rostker's sample is $3.77, we have: 
— (40)(3.77) + (4)(1.5)(3.77) 173.42 
W° = ^—^ —— = = $3.9414 
44 44 
p 
(40)(3.77) + (2)(2)(3.77) 165.88 
Wl = ^—^ K-^-^ = = $3.9495 
42 42 
p 
Next consider the interaction terms. Under specification A, we have 
(making use of the fact that the mean value of the moonlighting wage 
is $3.40): 
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I°A = (W°m - Wp)hl 
• = (3.40 - 3.9495)(44) = -24.18 (A6) 
PA = (3.40 - 3.9495)(42) = -23.08 
Under the assumption that labor income earned by others in the 
household does not change, the analogous values of the interaction term 
under specification B are: 
PB = Wphp + Z 
= (3.9414)(44) + Z = 173.42 + Z (A7) 
fB = (3.9495)(42) + Z = 165.88 + Z 
Thus, the relevant percentage changes41 to be used are: 
Afc„ 42 -44 
K 
AWp 
A/. 
IA 
MB 
- - ^.J^J /u 
44 
3 9495 - 3 9414 
3.9414 
(-23.08) - (-24.18) 
-24.18 1 - 1 9 / " 
_ 165.88 - 173.42
 = 
(A8) 
IB 173.42 
Substituting (A8) and the parameters for specification A and B into 
(A4), the percentage change in moonlighting hours under specification 
A is given by: 
%Mim = (-0.126)(0.206) + ( - 1 . 4 0 6 X - 4.545) (A9) 
+ (0.074)(-4.549) = 6.03% 
and that under specification B: 
%Lhm = (-0.862)(0.206) + (-1.255)(-4.545) (A10) 
+ ( - 0 . 1 7 5 ) ( - 4.549) = 6.32% 
41
 Note that this is an approximation since the exact term for AIB/IB is given by: 
MB = (165.88 + Z) - (173.42 + Z) = 165.88 - 173.42 
IB ~ 173.42 + Z ~ 173.42 + Z 
Unfortunately, the mean value of Z in the sample was not reported. The approximation 
used above assumed that Z = 0. Thus, A/fl//B= -4.348 percent represents an upper 
bound. To obtain a lower bound, let Z approach infinity. This implies that MB/IB is close 
to zero, and that a lower bound for the percentage change in moonlighting hours under 
specification B is: 
%A/zm = (-0.862X0.206) + (-1.255)(- 4.545) = 5.53% 
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Taken together, they suggest that our best estimate is that the simul-
taneous increase in the overtime premium and the reduction in overtime 
hours would increase moonlighting hours by approximately 6 percent. 
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